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1. Introduction 
In the modern food marketplace, the consumer is faced with challenges (increased market 
complexity, relatively scare cognitive resources and lifestyle changes), which urge the 
consumer to rely less on a thorough consideration of food attributes and nutritional/health 
consequences when faced with food choices. As a consequence traditional ‘cognitive’ food 
marketing (i.e., food marketing that refers to problem solving or to the achievement of 
product attributes/benefits) may fail, since this is based on information, which the consumer 
to an increasing degree does not seem to take into consideration (e.g., Mahajan and Wind 
2002).  
 Cognitive dissonance theory (Soutar and Sweeney, 2003; Festinger, 1957) implies that 
a consumer when faced with a decision problem (like buying a food product) seeks to balance 
her/his knowledge, attitudes, goals, feelings or desires in order to serve her/his self-interest 
and to avoid a state of cognitive dissonance. Growing evidence (Dolfsma, 2002; Betmann et 
al., 1998; Denzau and North, 1994) suggests, however, that in the complex real world 
consumers rarely have a comprehensive idea of what behavior may serve their interests in the 
best way. Nevertheless, consumers keep on buying food products, and many other products 
and services every day, without necessarily ending up in dissonant and stressful states. In 
trying to understand this behavior consumer research has proposed that when consumers are 
facing a complex decision-making situation and/or if they are under time pressure, consumers 
may use decision (or cognitive) heuristics to simplify the task and thereby regain competence 
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to select best choices (e.g., Lee and Marlowe, 2003; Allison et al., 1990; Kaas, 1984; Payne, 
1976). Also, it has been proposed that consumers in some situations may instead evaluate 
products based on a holistic, or affective, approach. For instance research suggests that the 
perceived physical appearance may affect consumers’ expectations of liking for a food and 
subsequently buying intentions (Hurling and Shepherd, 2003). This view is supported by 
gestalt theory proposing that a consumer may hesitate to use mental resources to analyze 
individual attributes if the mere holistic perception (the ‘gestalt’) provides the consumer with 
‘sufficient’ information to justify her/his decision. In this paper we propose, however, that 
neither of these approaches are sufficient enough to explain the decision problems that 
confront the consumer in the supra-complex marketplace. 
 We suggest that in the supra-complex marketplace consumers will refrain from 
evaluating products based on attributes per se because consumers’ felt competencies to handle 
choice complexity by referring to product attributes have decreased to a level where they have 
become insufficient. Thus, in the supra-complex marketplace consumers no longer play with 
product attributes in order to assess the product’s value to them. Instead they play with 
something else, which we in this paper propose to be mental markers in order to assess 
justification for consuming that particular product. While refraining from evaluating attributes 
may be relatively harmless when carried out in relation to products like furniture, clothes, 
mobile phones, etc., obviously its consequences can be serious in relation to food products 
due to their impact on the human body: (1) they may lead to the consumption of unhealthy 
food which would not have been bought upon thorough cognitive considerations; (2) they 
may seriously limit health authorities’ and the marketers’ ability to educate the consumer by 
information campaigns. As a consequence, this paper focuses especially on investigating the 
central propositions of our concern in relation to consumer food behavior. In the following 
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sections we discuss consumer food behavior under simple, complex and supra-complex 
choice conditions; we discuss the concepts of complexity and supra-complexity extensively 
and provide a framework for understanding consumer decision-making under conditions of 
supra-complexity. Also, we provide a case-example to illustrate our suggestions. Finally, we 
discuss the implications of the proposed framework and provide suggestions for further 
research. 
 
2. Consumer behavior under conditions of perceived non-complexity, perceived 
complexity and perceived supra-complexity 
 
Conceptualizing perceived complexity 
By nature, consumers will seek to serve their self-interests. The main problem confronting the 
consumer is thus to find the ‘best’ road to accomplish this task. We suggest that ‘perceived 
complexity’ is a key construct for the purpose of understanding how consumers’ respond to 
the task of fulfilling their self-interests in various choice situations. If consumers’ rationality 
was unbounded and if they had unlimited amounts of time they would always know what 
choices to make to serve their interests - and since this can happen with full certainty no 
cognitive dissonance would occur. In principle, choice complexity therefore does not arise 
because of characteristics related to the marketplace; it arises because consumers’ processing 
capacity is limited, which prevents consumers from processing unlimited amounts of 
cognitive information in relation to all choice situations. Thus, in many choice situations 
consumers are burdened with bounded rationality. Bounded rationality can be seen either as 
the attempt to do as well as possible given the demands of the world – the notion of 
optimization under constraints – or as the suboptimal outcome of the limited cognitive system 
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(cf. Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003). However, not all consumers suffer equally from bounded 
rationality in relation to all choice problems, since the main answer to bounded rationality is 
learning. Learning means developing a (cognitive) knowledge structure consisting of concepts 
and categories, which can be used for interpretation and evaluation of the real world (Denzau 
and North, 1994). Since no two consumers have exactly the same structure, choice complexity 
is subjective and therefore the concept ‘perceived complexity’ is appropriate. In relation 
hereto, one way of conceptualizing perceived complexity is by addressing entropy, which is a 
principle derived from physics indicating the degree of disorder in a system that has been 
applied to marketing research (e.g., Swait and Adamowicz, 2001). A system with an entropy 
equal to 0 is in ‘perfect order’, while a system with an entropy of 1 has reached its limit and is 
in ‘perfect disorder’. In a consumer research context, we may think of perceived complexity 
as being equal to the degree of perceived information disorder – or uncertainty - in a certain 
choice situation. When perceived information disorder increases, the transformation of market 
information into knowledge will impose a higher burden on the consumer due to bounded 
rationality. Thus, perceived choice complexity can be conceptualized as the perceived 
difficulty of transforming information into knowledge in relation to a certain choice situation. 
This transformation process is moderated by the consumer’s already established knowledge 
structure since perceived choice complexity can be expected to decrease with a more 
sophisticated and developed (context-specific and generalized) knowledge structure (e.g., 
Zinkhan and Braunsberger, 2004). 
 
Consumer choice under different forms of perceived complexity 
A product, and everything that comes with it, can be denoted as the output the consumer may 
obtain from accepting the offering, whereas the price to be paid can be seen as the input. 
 4
Under conditions of perceived non-complexity all product attributes can in principle be 
perceived ‘unbiased’ (Riesz, 1978; Lichtenstein and Burton, 1989) and suppliers and 
consumers do not disagree noteworthy about the content of the attributes. A very simple 
choice situation arises if a consumer perceives the products in a certain product category to be 
homogeneous. In such a situation, the consumer’s main problem is to locate the supplier, 
which offers the product at the lowest price. No extra attributes would be evaluated since the 
consumer would not expect such an evaluation to be beneficial. This simple choice situation 
is marked ‘A0’ in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  
Consumer choice under different forms of perceived complexity – illustrated by the use of 
‘price’. 
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from information to knowledge is getting more complicated. First, the consumer does not 
evaluate objective characteristics, s/he evaluates attributes (i.e., ‘ascribed characteristics'), and 
the two are not necessarily in accordance. Second, due to bounded rationality, the 
transformation from information to knowledge is no longer free from costs and the consumer 
therefore now face the task of allocating resources to the choice problems that are most 
important to their interests. When perceived complexity increases only moderately 
(corresponding to the choice situation marked ‘A1’ in Figure 1), consumers’ are not heavily 
burdened by this task since attribute-information can still relatively easily be categorized, 
interpreted and evaluated. The consumer is therefore able - and because of the limited 
pressure on mental resources presumably also willing - to evaluate available product 
attributes.  
 The theory of optimal search (Stigler, 1961) suggests that a consumer will continue 
his/her search for information until the marginal costs of search becomes greater than the 
marginal expected return (i.e., the expected output of a product). Hence, when complexity 
continues to increase (corresponding to B0, refer to Figure 1), the consumer will first seek 
information concerning attributes that are believed to be the most important for a successful 
outcome of the decision-making and may refrain from evaluating all the available attributes 
due to scarce resources. The curve from A1 to B0 therefore has an upward slope. In Figure 1 
we switch to the letter ‘B’ to illustrate that the consumer is now burdened with restrictions on 
her/his mental capacity when evaluating attributes. 
 When perceived complexity increases further, the burden on consumers’ mental 
resources increases subsequently. Many authors (e.g., Swait and Adamowicz, 2001; Bettman 
et al., 1998; Wilkie, 1974) have proposed that consumers will shift toward a simplified choice 
heuristic as perceived complexity increases and thereby also the risk of making ‘improper’ 
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choices. Decision-making heuristics have been grouped into different types (i.e., attribute-by-
attribute versus alternative-by-alternative comparisons) and also according to whether or not a 
consumer is willing to make a trade-off (i.e., compensatory versus non-compensatory 
decision-making). Thus, heuristics are used by consumers to reduce complex decision tasks to 
simple operations and has also been described as ‘inferential rules of thumb’ (Allison et al., 
1990). Simplifying the decision-making may also involve associations; for example, a 
consumer inferring the level of one attribute from the level of another attribute (Osselaer and 
Janiszewski, 2001). In Figure 1, this choice situation is illustrated by situation B1. In this 
situation, consumers’ evaluation of available attributes decreases with increasing perceived 
complexity as consumers are using choice heuristics.  
 We suggest that in some choice situations, and perhaps increasingly by number, 
consumers will refrain from evaluating products based on attributes per se because decisions 
about attributes have become supra-complex. Supra-complex decision-making occurs when 
the perceived difficulty of transforming product information into knowledge exceeds the 
expected benefits of doing so, even if decision-making heuristics, or other kind of attribute-
related decision rules, were applied. In such situations, we cannot measure decision 
effectiveness as how close the consumer’s decisions come to an ideal marketplace in which 
all product attributes are perceived and evaluated, since in such a supra-complex marketplace 
the consumer does not play with product attributes for the sake of evaluating products. The 
reason is that the consumer’s knowledge structure is simply insufficient to match the task of 
evaluating attributes and thus the transformation process would require an improved 
knowledge structure. Such a refined knowledge (or cognitive) structure can, however, rarely 
be established on the spot but requires a learning process, which is resource demanding. 
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 In the supra-complex marketplace consumers’ still – of course – like to serve their 
own interests. Thus, we have to find a way to deal with supra-complexity without violating 
this basic assumption about human behavior. In other words, we need some sort of mental 
model, which accounts for the lack of consumer competencies to deal with attributes but 
which still allows consumers to evaluate the ‘properness’ of their decisions. We suggest that 
such a mental model should rely on the principle of ‘mental justification’. In Figure 1 this 
principle is illustrated by the consumer’s use of perceived price in situation ‘C’. In situation 
C, the consumer may be just as price sensitive as in the more classical situation of A0 – but for 
other reasons. In A0 price acts as cost component, and nothing else. In C, price may be used as 
a ‘mental marker’ for the purpose of justifying the decision under the condition of perceived 
supra-complexity. A short example may illustrate this suggestion. A consumer wanting to buy 
a factory-made cake in a supermarket may simply give up on evaluating attributes (i.e. 
nutritional factors) since the consumer may not feel that any useable knowledge concerning 
the ‘best’ buy is obtained by conducting this evaluation. Instead, the consumer may simply 
pick the cake with the lowest price; not for the sake of inferring something about the 
remaining attributes but for the sake of obtaining mental justification: Even if the consumer 
picks a low-quality cake this situation could easily be mentally justified by referring to the 
low price. Thus, such a consumer can still maintain the belief that her/his own interests have 
been served – even though s/he may only have a slight idea of what is actually contained in 
the product. In the next main section the suggestion that consumers use mental markers to 
justify their decisions under conditions of perceived supra-complexity will be discussed in 
further detail. 
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 Antecedents to perceived complexity and supra-complexity 
Above we suggested that perceived complexity results from perceived system disorder, which 
to a higher or lesser degree makes it difficult for consumers to transform market information 
into knowledge. As already touched upon, consumers’ knowledge structures (i.e., the 
cognitive organization of concepts and categories, which can be used for mental processing) 
may therefore influence perceived complexity (Lurie, 2004; Alba and Hutchinson, 1987). A 
consumer who meets a choice problem with a well-developed knowledge structure can - other 
things being equal - more easily organize and interpret problem related stimuli than 
consumers with less developed structures. The knowledge structure involves both context-
specific and generalized components. Research (Zinkhan and Braunsberger, 2004) suggests 
that the two kinds of components are related; since knowledge structures developed in one 
context can be generalized to contribute to knowledge structures related to other (similar) 
contexts. That is, knowledge structures are transferable across related product categories. In 
the supra-complex marketplace neither the context-specific nor the generalized components 
are, however, sophisticated enough for providing the consumer with a sufficient platform for 
making decisions based on product attributes. Given the notion that consumers meet a choice 
problem with a certain knowledge structure (which also may include knowledge of cultural 
values, social norms, and the like) many other factors may also influence perceived choice 
complexity.  
 One main factor relevant for the present context is the type of the available attributes. 
Basically, product information can be classified into two groups of attributes (Nelson, 1970, 
1974): (1) search attributes, which concern product properties that can be determined by the 
consumer before actually purchasing the product, (2) experience attributes, which concern 
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product properties that can be perceived and evaluated by consumer usage such as the taste of 
a new food product. When a consumer shops for a search good (i.e., a good for which the 
number of salient search attributes exceeds the number of salient experience attributes) the 
more shops that are visited, and the more products that are considered, the higher the 
probability of getting the most preferred combination of attributes and price. In the case of 
experience goods (i.e., a good for which the number of salient experience attributes exceeds 
the number of salient search attributes), the consumer has not only the usual search cost, but 
also the cost of testing the good (refer to Becker, 2000). This is likely to increase consumers’ 
perceived choice complexity, since for experience goods the consumer can only evaluate the 
salient attributes when using the product. In addition to the distinction between search and 
experience attributes, Darby and Karni (1973) introduced the term credence. Credence 
attributes concern product properties that either cannot be perceived and evaluated by the 
consumer in the usage situation or can only be evaluated through expert assistance, e.g., the 
long-term health effects of certain food products. Empirical research supports the 
categorization into search, experience and credence attributes and also demonstrates that 
various consumers seem to agree on the categorization of attributes (Kaas and Busch, 1996). 
However, the term credence increases possible information asymmetry, which may exist 
between seller and buyer (Becker, 2000). This asymmetry makes the seller an ‘expert’ who 
tells the customer what s/he needs. Credence is thus a matter of trust. Since the consumer 
cannot transform credence information into knowledge because of the lack of verifiability, 
credence attributes are likely to be associated with a high degree of choice complexity.  
 Time availability is another factor with potential influence on perceived complexity. A 
consumer being short of time in relation to a choice problem, which under no restrictions on 
time would have been perceived to be only moderately complex (like the choice situation 
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marked ‘A1’ in Figure 1) may refrain from evaluating the offered attributes but may instead 
switch to other decision-making strategies. Thus, as it has been advanced by previous 
research (e.g., Lurie, 2004; Payne et al., 1993) time pressure may increase perceived 
complexity and in the present context, time pressure may push the consumer along the curve 
displayed in Figure 1 towards more complex choice situations. If complexity due to specific 
combinations of search, experience and credence attributes and/or time restrictions increases 
to a degree where the consumer no longer feels able to engage in attribute interpretation for 
the purpose of evaluating the considered variants, a state of perceived supra-complexity has 
been reached. On top of this research (Swait and Adamowicz, 2001; Bettman et al., 1998; 
Simonson and Tversky, 1992; Payne, 1993; Baumeister and Vohs, 2003) has shown that also 
the number of attributes, the correlation between attributes, number of alternatives, preceding 
choice situations, among other factors, may influence perceived complexity. 
 
3.  Consumers facing supra-complex choices – a suggested framework  
 
The principle of mental justification has been widely verified as an important determinant on 
consumers’ propensity to act. For example, recent research (Okada, 2005) suggests that 
people will be less likely to consume hedonic goods when the situation makes it difficult for 
them to justify it. The need for justification may arise because there is a sense of guilt 
associated with hedonic consumption (Okada, 2005). Moreover, attribute balance theory 
suggests that consumers will avoid extreme attribute combinations (e.g., on a 100-point rating 
scale the combination of 60/60 will be preferred over the combination of 50/70 since the 
former has a more balanced attribute combination). According to Chernev (2005) this is due 
to the fact that the more balanced combination is the easiest to justify. This view is in 
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accordance with the suggestion put forward by other researchers (e.g., Shafir et al., 1993) that 
under uncertainty (i.e., when insufficient knowledge is possessed) consumers seek reasons to 
justify their choices. In a more general sense, consumers want to mentally justify their choices 
in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger’s (1957) early 
conceptualization a person can be described as being in a dissonant state if two elements in 
her/his cognition (e.g., her/his knowledge of her-/himself, her/his attitudes, feelings or 
desires) are in imbalance. Festinger suggests that dissonance can be “…an extremely painful 
and intolerable thing” (p. 266).  
 In some choice situations consumers may readily determine that one product 
alternative dominates other alternatives. In such situations perceived complexity is low and so 
is cognitive dissonance since mental justification is easily attained. In other choice situations 
consumers’ may find all alternatives equally attractive. In principle, such situations could 
arise because the consumer lacks the competence to compare the alternatives or because the 
alternatives represent an equal value to the consumer. Both causes will hinder the consumer in 
mentally justifying the choice by referring to one or more product attributes (Swait and 
Adamowicz, 2001). However, consumers will still try to seek reasons for their behavior 
(Shafir et al., 1993) and since such reasons cannot be reached by balancing preferences 
against expected product benefits (e.g., ‘I prefer attribute X, which seems to part of product Y 
and therefore I can justify buying product Y’) consumers must find other ways to mentally 
justify their actions. We suggest that consumers, when facing supra-complex choice 
conditions, are likely to use mental markers to justify their decisions. We conceptualize a 
mental marker as ‘any mental construct the consumer uses for the purpose of gaining mental 
justification of overall choices’. Mental markers may, among other factors, include corporate 
brands, labels, self-perceptions, price, etc. (refer to further discussion below). By ‘overall’ we 
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mean choices that are not justified by referring to specific product benefits but choices that are 
justified by balancing the mental markers against the (sub-)goals that consumers may bring to 
- or may construct at - the marketplace (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 1999; Bettman et al., 1998). 
Our proposed framework for understanding consumer decision-making under supra-complex 
choice conditions is displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. 
Supra-complex decision-making: mental justification, choice properness and the  
 
interdependence of goals and mental markers 
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goals that ‘match’ the available mental markers. The sub-goals, which consumers construct on 
the spot or which they bring with them to the marketplace, may – on the other hand - also 
influence the selection of mental markers. We propose that mental justification results from 
the consumers seeking a mental balance between their sub-goals and the mental markers. 
Thus, consumers establish goals for good reasons. Goals serve as personal blueprints for 
directing the consumer’s behavior and thus goals also constitute useful referents in the 
process of mentally justifying intended and/or actual choice behavior.   
 
Sub-goals and mental justification 
In the marketplace consumers will have to exercise some degree of self-regulation in order to 
identify ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ decisions. Control process theory (e.g., Carver and 
Scheier, 1982; 1990) suggests that goals can invoke a regulatory influence on consumer 
decision-making and also that goals can be activated when the consumer is confronted with 
various choice situations. For example, a consumer buying a brand on a routine basis may be 
exposed to information in the news saying that the production process related to that 
particular brand is under suspicion that it may harm the environment. The consumer may now 
find it difficult to mentally justify the continuing buying of that particular brand since the 
consumer’s assumed sub-goal of conducting environmental friendly behavior is now 
compromised. Also, recent research (Chernev, 2005) has demonstrated that in order to 
maintain status quo (which is easiest to justify since abnormal choices are avoided; Simonson 
and Tversky, (1992)) consumers use goals. Consumers are believed to organize goals into 
goal hierarchies where lower-level goals may help obtaining higher-level goals. Higher-level 
goals (like achieving mental justification) represent the most basic consumer motivation. The 
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goal hierarchy can be regarded as a way the consumer breaks up complex (and perhaps long 
range) problems into smaller (and perhaps short range) and more manageable problems.  
 Lawson (1997) proposes a hierarchical goal structure consisting of four levels of 
goals; abstract principles or values, actions programs, more concrete product acquisition, and 
brand acquisition goals. Heckenhausen and Kuhl (1985) distinguish between action goals 
(concerned with the act itself), outcome goals (immediate effects on action), and 
consequences (indirect effects stemming from outcomes). Consumer goals may be activated 
at different levels of abstraction (master goals, sub-goals) but may also be grouped according 
to whether or not a consumer is willing to make a trade-off (i.e., compensatory versus non-
compensatory goals). Bettman et al. (1998) propose a ‘choice goals framework’ in which the 
construction of preference may be guided by the goals that the consumer brings to the 
marketplace. Examples of such goals, which all are contextual, include maximizing the 
accuracy of the choice, minimizing the cognitive effort required to make the choice, 
minimizing the experience of negative emotions when making the choice, and maximizing the 
ease of justifying the decision (p. 193). In this ‘choice goals framework’ consumers are 
assumed to relate product attributes to their goals in order to choose the product, which best 
satisfies the chosen goal(s). Thus, goal fulfilment is expected to occur as a consequence of 
consumers’ selection and achievement of certain product attributes. In such a (complex) 
marketplace consumers are assumed to carry out their decision-making based on an analysis 
of the product content and of the derived consequences of that content. While we agree with 
Bettman et al. that “choices are made to achieve goals” (p. 192) the choice goals framework 
does not, however, handle choice situations in which a consumer is unable to relate product 
attributes to the chosen/constructed goals. We posit that under conditions of supra-complexity 
consumers will seek to balance mental markers and sub-goals in order to mentally justify the 
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considered decision. The successfulness of these balancing activities will then in turn affect 
the perceived properness of the considered decision. In relation hereto, a distinction can be 
made between the psychological-oriented goals put forward by Bettman et al. and more 
product-oriented goals, which may be more directly related to various food products (e.g., the 
achievement of healthiness, pleasure feeling and enjoyment, value-for-money, social 
approval, tastefulness, naturalness, nutritional value, and the like (Zeithaml, 1988; Okada, 
2005). (The proposed links between mental markers, sub-goals, and master goal, resembles – 
in principle – the proposals put forward by Gutman (1997). Gutman considers the elements in 
a means-end chain - attributes, consequences, and values – to be elements in a goal hierarchy 
and suggests that “it is easier and more direct to think of goals being achieved than to think 
about attributes, consequences, and values being achieved” (p. 548). For example, a consumer 
who considers buying a cereal may attach various associations to this product category (e.g., 
amounts of calories, taste, social approval, etc.) but not all these associations may reflect the 
goal(s) that the consumer may have in mind when considering buying the cereal. In our 
model, which is specifically directed as explaining choice behaviour under supra-complex 
conditions, we refer instead to mental markers (as opposed to ‘attributes’ in Gutman’s 
framework), subgoals, and master goal (mental justification).  
 Mental justification can be classified upon whether a state of positive, neutral or 
negative justification is obtained as the outcome of the balancing process. Positive 
justification occurs when the consumer perceive that the constructed sub-goals are more than 
fulfilled by the use of mental markers, whereas neutral justification happens when mental 
markers match the constructed sub-goals. Positive and neutral justification may lead to 
purchase intentions if no other action barriers are present. However, if a neutral or positive 
balance between mental markers and sub-goals cannot be constructed (i.e., negative mental 
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justification) this does not necessarily mean that the consumer will hesitate from carrying out 
the decision. Instead, the consumer may switch to other kinds of strategies in order to reduce 
the mental imbalance that may arise as a consequence of a perceived gap between mental 
markers and sub-goals. For example, the consumer can modify the importance of the gap by 
seeking to convincing her/himself that the gap is unimportant; the consumer can mentally 
postpone perceived negative consequences of a certain behavior (e.g., smokers mentally 
postponing the unhealthy consequences of smoking); and/or the consumer can simply seek to 
neglect the goal or construct it to be of minor importance. Thus, consumers do not necessarily 
try to create justifications for all decisions; rather they seek to justify decisions they are 
motivated to make (Kunda, 1990) or which they cannot justify by using other mental 
strategies. 
 
Mental markers 
In section 2 of this paper we provided an example of how ‘price’ may be used by consumers 
as a mental marker in a supra-complex choice situation. A range of other factors, related to 
the selling company, the product, the consumer, food authorities and/or the situation, may 
also serve as mental markers. It is well documented that many consumers buy ecological food 
products because of animal welfare and/or environmental concerns and not because of an 
insight on how ecological product attributes may impact the food product itself.  
 Many companies engage in ‘corporate branding’, which conveys the essence, culture, 
character, and purpose of a company. In the process of corporate branding companies seek to 
link corporate identity (i.e., the corporate internal part of the brand) with corporate image (i.e., 
the external perception of corporate identity) (Rode and Vallaster, 2005). When successful, a 
corporate brand may serve as a mental marker for consumers who simply may choose a 
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product based on a belief that (desirable) internal company values (e.g., a company promising 
to deliver only the ‘best’) are transferred to the offered products. In such incidents, consumers 
evaluate the company instead of product attributes. The company brand here serves as a 
mental marker.  
 In some countries, food authorities have introduced ‘nutritional labels’ that divide 
food products into healthy, less healthy and unhealthy products - thereby making it easier for 
consumers to choose healthy food products without having to evaluate product attributes. 
 Self-perception theory suggests that consumers may use themselves as mental markers 
for accessing the properness of the considered decision. Consumers may perform evaluations 
by monitoring their subjective affective responses (feelings and emotions) to the product. 
Consumers may infer their overall evaluation (do I like this product?) from their affective 
response (do I feel good about this product?) to the product under consideration. In their 
affect-as-information framework Schwarz (1990) and Schwarz and Clore (1996) posit that 
affective responses may contain valuable judgmental information to consumers. In such 
situations consumers use their affective responses as mental markers for inferring the overall 
likeability of the product. This view is supported by results obtained by Pham et al. (2001) 
suggesting that target-induced feelings may predict the number and valence of people's 
spontaneous thoughts about a target; and may even be better predictors than people's cold 
assessments of the target. Many other researchers (e.g., Damasio 1994; Wyer et al. 1999) also 
have emphasized that people may perform evaluations by monitoring their subjective 
affective responses to the target.  
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 Choice properness 
Consumers will seek to avoid making decisions, which they know, or suspect, cannot be 
justified. We thus posit that mental justification is an overall, non-compensatory goal to most 
consumers. Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that consumers are motivated to maintain 
both intrapersonal and interpersonal balance. That is consumers will prefer consistency 
between their behavior and their personal goals as well as consistency with the goals they 
believe relevant others to have – or with the goals they believe will be beneficial for relevant 
others to strive for; e.g., when a consumer seeks to buy healthy food products for her/his 
family members. In supra-complex choice situations consumers do not ‘measure’ the 
properness of their choices by referring to the content of the product but by mentally 
estimating the degree to which their goals (either they are stable or constructed at the point of 
purchase) are fulfilled and - subsequently - whether the choice can be mentally justified. 
These relations are diagrammatical displayed in Figure 1.  
 Keller and Staelin (1987) and Jacoby (1977), among others, have suggested that 
complexity may have an inverted U-shaped relationship with decision effectiveness. That is, 
in highly complex markets consumer decision-making is less efficient than in complex 
markets because of bounded rationality. Decision effectiveness can be conceptualized as how 
close a consumer’s decision comes to the decision that would have been made in a perfect 
informational environment in which consumers can accurately process all available 
information, are willing to incur the cost of thinking, and are motivated and compensatory 
decision makers. However, recent research (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) suggests that - under 
conditions of high complexity - it may not be advantageous for consumers to engage in 
thorough conscious information evaluation before choosing. First, due to bounded rationality 
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consumers tend to take into account only a subset of the relevant information when they 
decide. Second, consumers tend to inflate the importance of some attributes at the expense of 
other, for example when using choice heuristics, which can lead to suboptimal weighting of 
the importance of attributes. Based on a series of experiments Dijkersterhuis et al. found that - 
when exposed to the same information - people who deeply thought about the information 
before choosing were less able to make the best choice (both when ‘best choice’ was 
measured objectively and subjectively) among complex products (in the experiments 
conceptualized as ‘products with many associated attributes’). In sum, while the quality of 
thoughtful choices deteriorate with complexity, less thoughtful choices do not share this 
characteristic because they do not confront with the bounded rationality of consumers. The 
study by Dijkersterhuis et al. investigates attribute-related choices under simple and complex 
choice conditions but it does not consider the mental process that mediates the link between 
complex choice conditions and behavioural response. We believe that the model displayed in 
Figure 1 offers a possible outline of the mental process that may occur when complexity has 
increased to a level where consumers’ ability to deal with attributes has become insufficient. 
However, based on the results obtained by Dijkersterhuis et al., one may argue that consumers 
(when complexity increases) switch to supra-complex decision-making because prior 
experience may cause them to believe that they are better off this way. That is, they may 
recognize that refraining from dealing with attributes may lead to better choices because of 
reductions in cognitive dissonance, usage of mental resources and time-usage. This way, 
consumers still behave in a (intended) rational way. Future research may wish to further 
investigate this topic.  
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4. Case-example 
Case: The bread market.  
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 . Conclusion 
Not more than three decades ago the market for bread was a very simple one. Although
bread is heavily culture-bounded (i.e., the types of bread differ among various cultures)
the bread supply was in most countries centred on just a few overall types. Within these
types the different variants only varied along a few number of attributes. For instance,
in Denmark (which is here used as an illustrating example), the variations for e.g. the
‘French bread type’ were limited to the shape of the bread and to whether grains were
sprinkled on the surface or not. The dough was essentially the same and thus the market
was uncomplicated, as most consumers possessed full knowledge about the attributes
(shape and topping) available. Price was a significant choice criterion for choosing a
particular variant of bread since the various variants were easy comparable and since
most consumer have well-established preferences. Thus, price was mainly regarded as a
cost component in consumer decision-making (i.e., the negative function of price;
Zeithaml, 1988). ‘Price A0’ in Figure 1 illustrates this market situation.  
 
During the eighties, and especially during the nineties, more attributes were introduced,
thereby increasing the number of bread variants available. For instance many different
kinds of ingredients like grains, and combinations of grains, were now used in the
various doughs or sprinkled on the surface of the breads. Along with this market
development, many consumers gradually lost insight into the many attributes, and
combinations of attributes, now available in the bread market. Therefore, consumers
were often faced with uncertainty when making judgments of the salient attributes of
breads. Such consumers may have tried to overcome their uncertainty and their lack of
knowledge by selecting one or more indicators (including price) as a basis for their
assessment of the desired product attributes. A higher price may signal higher quality
(i.e., the ‘positive’ function of price; Zeithaml, 1988) and may thus have been used as
an instrument for gaining ‘pseudo insight’ into the various bread attributes. In Figure 1,
this market situation is illustrated by ‘price B1’. Price B1 identifies a market situation
where consumers gradually are giving up on evaluating ‘complicated’ attributes but
instead are inferring them using other more ‘simple’ attributes.  
 
During the last decade the number of available attributes and attribute levels have
exploded. Not only has the number of bread variants been continuously increasing but
various consequences (i.e., nutritional consequences, health consequences) of
consuming the various breads have also been emphasized. As a result, many consumers
now seem almost incapable of determining and comparing salient attributes as a basis
for their choice as they face severe difficulties in maintaining knowledge of the
available attributes. As a consequence, the consumer may change her/his choice-
strategy. Instead of focusing on gaining one or more attributes and on finding the ‘right’
combination of these attributes, the consumer may refrain from evaluating any
attributes at all. Instead, the consumer may now focus on the overall choice situation. In
Figure 1, this market situation is illustrated by ‘price C’. The consumer is here using the
price as a ‘mental marker’ for justifying the overall choice situation – not for indicating
the presence of a certain level, or combination, of specific attributes. 21
The basic premise of our framework is that consumers want to make choices that are in their 
own interest (i.e., the fulfilment of goals), that is we believe the consumer to be intended 
rational. The approach taken here differs from previous research in a number of ways. First, 
we propose the construct ‘mental justification’, which is concerned with how consumers 
mentally justify certain decisions based on mental markers rather than product attributes. 
Second, we center our attention on the construct ‘choice properness’, which we conceptualize 
as ‘the consumer’s believed degree of goal fulfilment in a certain choice situation’. Prior 
studies calculate the properness of consumer choices in terms of ‘best choice’ (e.g., Muller, 
1984; Best and Ursic, 1986) and ‘decision effectiveness’ (e.g., Keller and Staelin, 1987), 
based on product attributes. Third, we propose that while complexity does affect the average 
degree of attribute evaluation in an inverted U-shaped relation, decisions may actually be 
reached just as effectively – and perhaps even more effectively – in supra complex markets 
than in markets with low complexity.  
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